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DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT (DRM) IN
ONLINE MUSIC STORES: DRM-ENCUMBERED
MUSIC DOWNLOADS' INEVITABLE DEMISE AS A
RESULT OF THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF
HEAVY-HANDED COPYRIGHT LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Music consumption will never be the same again. Album sales are
plummeting as more people switch to purchasing music online.' A
digitally downloaded album or song is a significantly different product
from a compact disc (CD) bought at a record store. The downloaded song
often comes equipped with Digital Rights Management (DRM) technology,
which is a form of encryption that limits the song's playback ability.2
Music publishers claim DRM technology is necessary to combat the
increase in piracy from both peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing programs and
advances in technology, such as increased broadband Internet access.
3
Until recently, the majority of songs purchased from any legal Internet
music provider contained DRM protection.4 In 2008, Amazon MP3
became the first online music store to offer music downloads from all four
major music labels, as well as several independent labels, unencumbered
by DRM technology. 5
1. See MSNBC.com, Album Sales Decline as Music Downloads Are Up,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ id/182 20349 (last visited Mar. 14, 2008); see also Toby Sterling,
After 25 Years, CDs Fall on Hard Times, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 19, 2007 at G6.
2. See BBCNews.com, Q&A: What is DRM?,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6337781.stm (Mar. 14, 2007) (stating that DRM allows
music copyright owners to set and enforce the terms by which listeners can use their music files,
such as limiting listeners' ability to copy the music and restricting its usage to a set number of
computers and portable music players).
3. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998); BBCNews.com, supra note 2.
4. See Kim Komando, Unprotected Format Options on Rise, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Sept.
17, 2007, at C2; see also Press Release, Apple, Apple Unveils Higher Quality DRM-Free Music
on the iTunes Store (Apr. 2, 2007), http:// www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/04/02itunes.html
(stating that in June 2007, Apple's iTunes Music Store (iTMS) partnered with music publisher
Electric and Musical Industries, Ltd. (EMI) to create iTunes Plus, a new iTMS feature that allows
users to download DRM-free tracks from EMI's music catalog).
5. See Eric Benderoff, Amazon Takes a Stab at iTunes Market: Site Offers Cheaper Music
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The music industry's recent acceptance of online music sales without
the accompanying DRM technology highlights a larger legal problem.
Namely, Congress and the music industry's attempts to control music
consumption by regulating the use of DRM in online music has had
unintended, detrimental consequences to both consumers and the music
industry. Over-regulation has forced the music industry to offer music
without DRM protection to compensate for the negative effects of DRM
legislation.
In enacting the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 6
Congress criminalized attempts to circumvent DRM technologies placed in
music by copyright holders. 7 The DMCA grants copyright holders an
unprecedented level of control over how their products are used and
accessed. 8 Regrettably, the DMCA has disturbed existing copyright law
that allowed courts to weigh the interests of protecting intellectual property
against the interests of encouraging competition and protecting consumer
choice. 9
The DMCA's legal protection of DRM technology has not been very
successful in the area of digital music downloads. The music industry has
been unable to stop piracy on the Internet. l° Moreover, the DMCA's
protection of DRM technology has led music retailers to use the law not to
prevent piracy, but to prevent interoperability between downloaded music
files and portable music players." In effect, the combination of the
DMCA and DRM created statutorily sanctioned anti-competitive behavior,
Downloads, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 26, 2007, at BI (noting that the top four labels are Warner Music
Group, Universal Music Group, EMI Music Group and Sony); see also Saul Hansell, Sony Drives
Another Nail in the D.R.M. Coffin, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2008,
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/0 1/1 0/sony-drives-another-nail-in-the-drm-
coffin/?ref-technology; FOXNews.com, Warner Music to Sell DRM-Free Music Via Amazon,
Dec. 31, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,319258,00.html.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
7. See id. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
8. See Timothy B. Lee, CATO Institute, Circumventing Competition: The Perverse
Consequences of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, at I (Mar. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pubid=6025.
9. See id.
10. See Grant Gross, Despite Lawsuits, P-to-P Use Still Growing, PC WORLD, Oct. 5 2007,
http:/ www.pcworld.com/article/138138/despiteilawsuits.ptop-use-still-growing.html.
11. See Digital Music Interoperability and Availability: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11-
14 (2005) [hereinafter Digital Music] (statement of Raymond Gifford, President, The Progress &
Freedom Foundation). For instance, Apple encrypts its DRM to play only on Apple's iPod, and
DRM'd music from competing music retailers will not play on the iPod. See Nicola F. Sharpe &
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Is Apple Playing Fair? Navigating the iPod Fairplay DRM
Controversy, 5 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 332, 333 (2007).
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which hurts both record label copyright holders and music consumers. 12
Part I of this comment introduces the main issues created by DRM
technology and the enactment of the DMCA. Part II frames the historical
tension between copyright law and restrictive technologies, such as DRM,
and discusses the current problems created by the enactment of the DMCA.
Part III explains how the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA forces
courts to focus on the narrow issue of DRM circumvention at the expense
of the more important issues of copyright infringement and piracy. Part IV
describes how the DMCA's legal protection of DRM enables companies to
misuse DRM in anti-competitive ways. Finally, Part V explains that DRM
has little practical effect on preventing piracy because it punishes
legitimate consumers.
The DMCA is a heavy-handed copyright law that was enacted to help
the music industry regulate music consumption on the Internet. 13 The law
has hurt both consumers and the music industry. The negative effects of
the DMCA have left the music industry with little choice but to offer music
unencumbered by DRM protections. 14 However, the outlook for the music
industry is not completely bleak. Sales of this unrestricted music may
actually benefit both music consumers and the music industry.
II. HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW, DRM, AND THE DMCA
The purpose of copyright law is to "promote the creation and
publication of free expression" by creating an economic incentive to
generate and distribute one's creation. 15 The Copyright Clause of the
Constitution gives Congress the power to legislate copyright terms "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science... by securing for limited Times to
Authors ... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings." 16 While the
Copyright Clause makes the content producer's expression of ideas
copyrightable, the ideas themselves are not. 17 The Supreme Court refers to
this as the "idea/expression dichotomy." 18 Copyright law recognizes five
exclusive rights for the copyright holder: (1) the right to reproduce, (2)
adapt, (3) publish, (4) perform, and (5) display the protected work. 19
12. See Digital Music, supra note 11.
13. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair Use, 20
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 49, 60 (2006); see generally S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998).
14. See, e.g., Benderoff, supra note 5.
15. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (emphasis removed).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219.
18. Id.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
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Digital Rights Management (DRM) technology offers control over the
protected work in both a legally and practically different manner than
traditional copyright protection.20 For instance, DRM technology allows
copyright holders to control the way consumers use their work once it is
in a digital format. 21 While copyright law is limited by such rules as
"term duration" (allowing copyright protection for only a certain amount of
time), "fair use" (allowing copyright protection to be circumvented in
special circumstances), and the "first sale doctrine" (allowing owners of
copyrighted material to sell that material without permission from the
copyright holder), DRM protection is not necessarily subject to the same
limitations. 22 Consequently, copyright holders use DRM technology
primarily to restrict the use or access of the copyrighted work, while
copyright law protects the underlying work from an unauthorized violation
of the copyright holder's exclusive rights to reproduce, adapt, publish,
perform, and display the protected work. 23
Regardless of this important distinction, as of 1998, DRM technology
enjoys statutory protection that is legally enforceable under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).24 Copyright law was amended by the
DMCA to grant copyright holders legal protection for use of DRM and
similar access control technology for copyrighted works.25 Section 1201 of
the DMCA makes it illegal to "avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or
impair" DRM technology embedded in copyrighted works. 26
Congress passed the DMCA for two reasons.27 The first reason was
to respond to pressures from the entertainment industries, which feared that
advances in technology would increase online piracy. 28 The second was
20. See MICHAEL A. EINHORN, MEDIA TECHNOLOGY AND COPYRIGHT: INTEGRATING LAW
AND ECONOMICs 47 (Edward Elgar Publ'g 2004).
21. See Christopher D. Kruger, Comment, Passing the Global Test: DMCA § 1201 as an
International Model for Transitioning Copyright Law into the Digital Age, 28 HOUS. J. INT'L L.
282, 283 (2006).
22. EINHORN, supra note 20, at 47.
23. See id.
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)-(b) (2000); see also EBERHARD BECKER, DIGITAL RIGHTS
MANAGEMENT: TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 367 (Springer
2004).
25. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 1:17 (Thompson/West
3d ed. 2006).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A) (2000).
27. See Aaron Burstein, Will Thomas DeVries & Peter S. Menell, The Rise of Internet
Interest Group Politics, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 12-13 (2004); Armstrong, supra note 13, at
60; S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998).
28. See Burstein, DeVries & Menell, supra note 27, at 12-13; see Armstrong, supra note
13, at 59 (arguing that "the combination of advancing compression technologies, wide availability
of desired entertainment products in easily reproducible digital form, increasing computer power
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the United States' obligations under the 1996 World Intellectual Property
Organization treaties, which mandated statutory protection for copyright
holders' use of DRM.29
Essentially, advances in technology concerned the music industry
because it made illegal copying of music files faster and easier than ever. 3
0
This fear of new technology was not a recent development. 3 In fact, the
industry's lobbying for the enactment of the DMCA was not the first time
the music industry had pressured Congress to pass new legislation
restricting access to technology. 
32
A. The Digital Audio Tape Machine: DRM's Beginnings and the
Introduction of the Audio Home Recording Act
After Sony and Phillips first introduced the compact disc as a medium
for music file storage in 1982, music became widely available in digital
format. 33  Four years later, Digital Audio Tape (DAT) machines were
created. Unlike traditional cassettes, which only allowed copies of
progressively inferior quality, DAT machines allowed users to make a
"perfect" copy of a compact disc without any loss in quality. 35 At that
time, the music industry feared that high quality audio copies would result
in piracy on a grand scale.36  The threat of legal action by the music
industry prevented the DAT machine from entering the consumer market
until seven years after its creation. 37 The delay prevented the DAT
machine from gaining a foothold in the market. 38
Congress' legislative reaction to the introduction of the DAT machine
is noteworthy because of the pressure it received from the music industry.
After much lobbying from the music industry,39 Congress passed the
and storage capacity, and growing access to the Internet at broadband speeds formed a 'perfect
storm."').
29. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998); see also Armstrong, supra note 13, at 60.
30. See Armstrong, supra note 13, at 60 n.41.
31. See Nika Aldrich, An Exploration of Rights Management Technologies Used in the
Music Industry, 2007 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 051001, 13-15, (2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-932088.
32. See id.
33. See BBCNews.com, Compact Disc Hits 25th Birthday,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6950845.stm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007).
34. See Aldrich, supra note 31, at 13-15.
35. See id.
36. See Jocelyn Dabeau & William Fisher, The DAT Controversy,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/ tfisher/music/DAT.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2007).
37. See Aldrich, supra note 31, at 14.
38. See id.
39. See Dabeau & Fisher, supra note 36.
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Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA) in 1992, which required all DAT
machines and other audio recorders to be equipped with Serial Copy
Management System (SCMS). 40 The SCMS technology allowed only first
generation copies of digital recordings, 41 meaning copies could only be
made from an original recording.42
In 1998, years after Congress passed the AHRA to address DATs, the
music industry invoked the statute for the first time when it sued Rio, the
manufacturer of one of the first portable MP3 players. 4 The trade group
that represents the United States recording industry, known as the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA),44 sued Rio for not
complying with the SCMS requirement of the AHRA.45 The court found
that computers and MP3 players were not digital audio recording devices
and were therefore not required to comply with the SCMS provision of the
AHRA. 46 Thus, the music industry needed another way to prevent the
perceived threats of emerging technologies. The 1998 Digital Millennium
Copyright Act followed.
B. From the AHRA to the DMCA
In many ways, the AHRA was a precursor to the DMCA because it
mandated the use of SCMS to prevent piracy, and SCMS technology is
similar to the DRM technologies used today. In fact, SCMS was the first
example of access restricting technology in the music industry.47 Section
1002(a)-(c) of the AHRA prohibits circumvention of SCMS 48 and is
arguably a precursor to the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA.49
However, the DMCA's anti-circumvention provision is more expansive
than the AHRA's provision because it directly prohibits the user's attempts
at circumvention, rather than mandating the circumvention protections to
40. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-02 (2000).
41. See id.
42. See Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52
AM. J. COMP. L. 323, 370 (2007).
43. See CONSUMER MULTIMEDIA REPORT, RIAA SUES OVER INTERNET MUSIC RECORDER
(Oct. 19, 1998), available at 1998 WLNR 3885640.
44. See RIAA.com, Who We Are, http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php (last visited Mar. 14,
2008).
45. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072,
1075 (9th Cir. 1999).
46. See id. at 1081.
47. See Aldrich, supra note 31, at 14.
48. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1002(a)-(c) (2000).
49. See June M. Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws and Copyright: A Report from the
Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 385, 437 (2004).
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companies that produce the devices., 0
Through the use of the AHRA, the music industry successfully
suppressed new technology such as the DAT machine. 5' Perhaps this
success led the music and movie industries to believe they could control
how music is transferred and consumed on the Internet through the DMCA.
However, the Internet is not as easily categorized and dismissed as was the
DAT machine. Steve Jobs, the Chief Executive Officer of Apple, said,
"[there] is this amazingly efficient distribution system for stolen property
called the Internet-and no one's gonna shut down the Internet." 52 Unlike
the DAT machine, the Internet cannot easily be set aside or become
obsolete. Consequently, restrictive copyright legislation will not
significantly affect Internet piracy of digital music. Therefore, the
DMCA's restrictive legal protection of DRM through its anti-
circumvention provision will lead to both the music consumer's and the
music industry's rejection of DRM protected music.
III. SECTION 1201 OF THE DMCA FORCES COURTS TO Focus ON THE
NARROW ISSUE OF DRM CIRCUMVENTION AT THE EXPENSE OF THE MORE
IMPORTANT ISSUES OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND PIRACY
Congress initially passed the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) with the intent to protect copyright holders' digital works from
Internet piracy.53 Congress was concerned that the Internet provided an
easy, quick, and inexpensive way for digital works to be transferred
between large groups of people. However, the DMCA's anti-
circumvention provision leaves courts with little flexibility in balancing the
rights of copyright holders against consumer choice and technological
innovation. Section 1201 of the DMCA directs courts to focus on whether
a Digital Rights Management (DRM) scheme is being circumvented, but
seems to ignore the arguably more important issue of whether DRM
protection is actually preventing piracy. 55  As a consequence, digital
content providers can misuse DRM as a legally enforceable means of
50. See id.
51. See AnimeNewsService.com, Sony Drops DAT, Nov. 30, 2005,
http://www.animenewsservice.com/archives/nov30.htm (reporting Sony's announcement that the
final domestic shipment of its DAT machines would occur early in December 2005).
52. Jeff Goodell, Steve Jobs: The Rolling Stone Interview, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 3, 2003,
available at
http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/5939600/steve-jobs-the-rolling-stone-interview/.
53. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998).
54. See id.
55. See id. at 28.
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restricting competition by preventing interoperability between downloaded
music and a competing company's digital music players.
Instead of creating new legislation that focuses on the use of DRM
technology to battle emerging technological threats, Congress should have
allowed the courts to use preexisting copyright precedent to find a more
nuanced approach to dealing with piracy. This approach would focus on
such issues as whether a listener's intention was to steal the music, rather
than on the narrow issue of whether a DRM protection scheme has been
violated.
As evidenced by the music industry's recent shift to once again
selling music unburdened by DRM protections, 56 the DMCA is simply
unnecessary legislation in the music industry's fight to protect itself against
new and potentially threatening technologies. Existing legislation, namely
the Copyright Act of 1976, the last major modification made to copyright
law, 57 already provided courts with a basic framework of copyright law
and the freedom to address issues raised by new technologies in common-
sense ways within that framework. When faced with factual scenarios
involving new and potentially copyright-infringing technologies, the courts
have crafted balanced decisions by taking into consideration the rights of
both the copyright holder and the consumer. 58 Perhaps the most well-
known example of the courts' ability to nimbly balance these competing
interests is Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 
59
A. The Court's Past Response to New Technology: Sony Corp. of America
v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
In Sony, the plaintiffs, who were copyright owners of television
programs, sued Sony, a manufacturer of home videocassette recorders
(VCRs), alleging that Sony's devices could be used for copyright
infringement, and Sony was therefore liable for any infringement
committed by the purchasers of Sony's VCRs. 60 The Supreme Court ruled
in favor of Sony, holding Sony could not be held liable for contributory
copyright infringement because VCRs had substantial non-infringing
uses. 61 Moreover, the Court found that personal use of VCRs to record
56. See Benderoff, supra note 5; Hansell, supra note 5; FOXNews.com, supra note 5.
57. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 92: COPYRIGHT LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
AND RELATED LAWS CONTAINED IN TITLE 17 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE (2007), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/title1 7/circ92.pdf.
58. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
59. Id.
60. Seeid. at 417.
61. See id. at 456.
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broadcast television programs for later viewing constituted fair use, which
was a complete defense to a claim of copyright infringement. 62 The Court
argued that the law must "strike a balance between a copyright holder's
legitimate demand for effective-not merely symbolic-protection of the
statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in
substantially unrelated areas of commerce." 63  Accordingly, even if a
device can be used for copyright infringement, courts will not hold the
device's manufacturers liable for copyright infringement if that device has
substantial non-infringing uses.
Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent that, "in the absence of a
congressional solution, courts cannot avoid difficult problems by refusing
to apply the law. We must 'take the Copyright Act... as we find
it' .... ,64 At the time of the Sony case, there was not yet any legislation,
such as the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA) or the DMCA,
specifically regulating new technologies. 65  When faced with issues
involving new technologies, the Court simply applied long established
principles of copyright law. 66
In Sony, the Court balanced the interests of consumers against the
interests of copyright holders so that all parties benefited from the decision.
Consumers enjoyed the benefits of taping television programs for later
viewing. 67 After Sony, copyright holders, including the movie industry,
profited when consumer spending on videocassettes reached $4.8 billion,
while the domestic box office totaled only $3.8 billion a year.
68
Additionally, many movie theater owners believed that the advent of the
VCR had a positive effect on movie theater attendance.69 Ultimately, both
consumers and the entertainment industries benefited in the wake of Sony
because the Court let technological innovation flourish. Nevertheless, the
Court narrowed Sony's holding nearly twenty years later when the
emergence of radically new technologies threatened the applicability of
copyright law and the holding of Sony.
62. See id. at 454-56.
63. Id. at 442.
64. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 500 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
65. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998) with 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-02 (1992).
66. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. 417.
67. See Antipiracy Feature Would Harm Booming VCR Sales, Retailers Warn, DISCOUNT
STORE NEWS, Oct. 27, 1986, http://fmdarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3092/isv25/ai_4512838/.
68. See id.
69. See id.
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B. The Court's Most Recent Response to New Technology. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd
The Court limited the scope of Sony in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. by narrowing Sony's "substantial non-
infringing use" defense. 70 In Grokster, the defendant company produced
and distributed peer-to-peer (P2P) software online, which allowed users to
share music files. 7" Many of the songs that users transferred to each other
were protected by copyright. 72 Grokster did not generate revenue from the
users themselves, but did profit from the streaming advertisements in its
program.73 Again, the Court faced the dilemma of balancing the copyright
holders' interests against the public interest in the face of new
technology. 74 The Court held that a company that encourages and profits
from the direct copyright infringement of third parties can be held
contributorily liable for copyright infringement by those third parties.75
Though the Court unanimously held that Grokster could be liable,76
the Justices differed in their reasoning. Justice Ginsburg found, in a
concurring opinion, that Grokster differed "markedly" from Sony because
there was an insufficient showing of substantial non-infringing uses,
suggesting that Grokster could be held liable without needing to address the
issue of secondary liability. 77 Justice Breyer concurred, finding that "a
strong demonstrated need for modifying Sony... has not yet been
shown.' ' 78 Critics of Grokster's fractured opinion argue that the Court's
ruling creates ambiguities as to when a defendant could be held liable for
inducing copyright infringement. 9
However, the Court's use of narrow language 80 suggests that its
holding applies to P2P software or substantially similar technology. The
Grokster Court focused on the defendants' intent, claiming that the
"inducement rule ... premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression
70. See Jill David, Note, Does Grokster Create a New Cause ofAction that Could Implicate
the Apple TV, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1197, 1230-31 (2007).
71. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005).
72. See id. at 920-21.
73. See id. at 926.
74. See id. at 928.
75. See id. at 919, 941.
76. See id. at 941, 948, 949.
77. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 944.
78. Id. at 965.
79. See, e.g., Kent Schoen, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Grokster: Unpredictability in Digital
Copyright Law, 5 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 156, 156 (2006).
80. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 919.
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and conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or
discourage innovation having a lawful promise."81 Sony is distinguishable
because the defendants did not intentionally induce copyright infringement
and the technology was markedly different than the technology at issue in
Grokster. 
82
For example, one can physically trace and restrict VCRs because they
are pieces of hardware, unlike Grokster's P2P software. 83  Copyright
infringement using a VCR is only possible on one recorder, for one
program, on one videocassette at a time.84 Grokster, on the other hand,
allowed users to both upload and download files from multiple people
simultaneously and quickly. 85
Using the theory of secondary liability to hold companies liable for
the actions of third parties, the Grokster Court looked at both the nature
and the producer of the technology.86 Unlike Grokster, Sony is a large,
well-known, multinational producer of electronic goods. 87 A company like
Sony would have little incentive to act illegally by intentionally promoting
copyright infringement because, at the time of the Sony decision, there was
a large and profitable market for videocassettes. 88  Conversely, the
overwhelming source of Grokster's revenue came from the sale of
advertising space viewed by consumers while using Grokster's software to
illegally transfer copyrighted files. 89
Due to the uncertain impact on copyright infringement of new and
rising technologies like Grokster's P2P software, the Court needed to
distinguish lawful, innovative technology from harmful, infringing
technology. 90 Viewed from this perspective, the Court's secondary
liability doctrine, which was founded on the theory of intentional
inducement of infringement, gave lower courts the flexibility to punish
companies creating technology solely to profit from copyright
infringement, while still protecting companies' production of new
81. Id. at 937.
82. See id. at 933-34.
83. See Brief for the Washington Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 7, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), No.
04-480, available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/mgmiWashington-Legal-brf.pdf.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37.
87. See Sony, Corporate Fact Sheet, http://www.sony.com/SCA/corporate.shtml (last visited
July 14, 2008).
88. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 931.
89. See id. at 925.
90. See id. at 936-37.
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technological innovations. 9'
C. The Court's Response to New Technology using the DMCA, and How
the DMCA Constrains Courts
The Court's main focus in both Sony and Grokster was on how the
new technology was used by consumers. 92  Embedded in the Court's
analysis of the use of new technology is an intrinsic and overarching
question of intention: Is the way that consumers use the new technology
undermining further technological innovation by granting companies a
monopoly over that technology? 93 With the introduction of the DMCA,
courts can no longer balance these interests as effectively and must instead
focus on technological means. A court must now ask whether the DRM
scheme is being circumvented to pirate content. 94 As Justice Breyer said in
his concurring opinion in Grokster:
Judges have no specialized technical ability to answer questions
about present or future technological feasibility or commercial
viability where technology professionals, engineers, and venture
capitalists themselves may radically disagree and where answers
may differ depending upon whether one focuses upon the time
of product development or the time of distribution. 9'
Accordingly, DRM is an example of technology for which "[j]udges
have no specialized technical ability." 
96
Copyright holders can use DRM legitimately to prevent access to
copyrighted works, but they can also abuse DRM in an anti-competitive
way to prevent interoperability. 97 In cases where new technology and
copyright infringement collide, courts should focus on whether copyright
holders' rights are being undermined, and not whether a DRM scheme has
been circumvented. Unfortunately, the enactment of § 1201 of the DMCA
prevents courts from taking into account the evolving nature of technology,
as the Supreme Court was able to do in Sony and Grokster. 9' As a
consequence, copyright law, which was originally intended to create a
limited monopoly designed to promote innovation, 99 is instead used to
91. See id.
92. Compare id. with Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 417.
93. See Grokster, 545 U.S. 913.
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
95. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 958 (Breyer, J., concurring).
96. Id.
97. See Lee, supra note 8.
98. See id. at 2.
99. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 943.
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suppress consumer choice and innovation by competing companies.
Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. and
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technology are two recent examples of
companies attempting this kind of suppression. 100
D. Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.
Instead of battling piracy, opportunistic companies misuse DRM to
advance their interests. 101 The result has been an increase in "private
control over content" through legally protected anti-circumvention
technologies. 102 Companies can use the DMCA's anti-circumvention
provision to provide an extra-legal layer of protection to their use of
DRM. 1
03
In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
printer manufacturer Lexmark sought to enjoin Static Control Components
(SCC), a manufacturer of low-cost replacement toner cartridges, from
producing cartridges for Lexmark printers. 104 Lexmark's toner cartridges
contained a microcontroller that performed a "secret handshake" with the
printer, preventing the printer from working with non-Lexmark
cartridges. 105 SCC's cartridges contained a "SMARTEK" chip that
replaced the Lexmark chip and allowed the Lexmark printer to work with
their toner cartridges. 106
Lexmark claimed that the SMARTEK chip violated the anti-
circumvention provision of the DMCA. 107 Rejecting Lexmark's argument,
the court held that the "handshake" was not an access-control security
device. 108 The court reasoned that anyone who owned a Lexmark printer
could read the authentication code from the printer because it was easily
visible. 109 Thus, because the authentication was not a security device, SCC
could not be held in violation of the DMCA's anti-circumvention
provision. 110 The court emphasized that Congress did not create the
100. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004);
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
101. See Lee supra note 8, at 15.
102. See Matt Jackson, Using Technology to Circumvent the Law. The DMCA's Push to
Privatize Copyright, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 607, 610 (2001).
103. See id. at 644.
104. See Lexmark Int'l, 387 F.3d at 529.
105. Id. at 530.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 531.
108. See id. at 546-47.
109. See id.
110. LexmarkInt'l, 387 F.3d at 547.
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DMCA's anti-circumvention provision to impose "liability for the
circumvention of technological measures designed to prevent consumers
from using consumer goods while leaving the copyrightable content of a
work unprotected." 1
The concurring opinion by Judge Merritt went even further in
denouncing this application of the DMCA by stating that the court's
"holding should not be limited to the narrow facts [of this case]." 112 He
explained that "[w]e should make clear that in the future companies like
Lexmark cannot use the DMCA in conjunction with copyright law to create
monopolies of manufactured goods for themselves." 113 However, the mere
fact that liability and the threat of litigation exists under the DMCA's anti-
circumvention provision is enough to grant companies the opportunity to
use the DMCA in just this way. While Judge Merritt understood the source
of the problem, the majority's holding is too narrow to adequately address
it. Had Lexmark hidden the authentication code, they could have claimed
that it was a "security device," and that SCC was circumventing Lexmark's
legitimate use of DRM protections under the DMCA. 114
Lexmark's ultimate concern was a loss in profits given the cheaper
cartridge alternatives offered by competitors. 115 Printer companies
typically under-price their printers because they expect to make up the
difference by selling their ink cartridges at a high margin. 116 By offering
low-cost ink cartridges, SCC posted a threat to Lexmark's business
model. 117 Accordingly, Lexmark used the DMCA's anti-circumvention
provision, not to protect its copyright or to prevent piracy, but rather to
maintain its high profit margins by preventing interoperability with
competing toner cartridges. 118
E. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technology
Although the court ruled in favor of SCC, its narrow holding did not
clearly limit the use of the DMCA to prevent inoperability. 119 Similarly, in
11. Id. at 549.
112. Id. at 551 (Merritt, J., concurring).
113. Id.
114. See id. at 547.
115. See David Bogoslaw, Lexmark Falls as Profit Picture Fades, BUSINESSWEEK, July 9,
2007, http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/jul2007/pi2007079_192036.htm.
116. See William Trent, Lexmark and HP's Business Model is Increasingly Unsustainable,
SEEKING ALPHA, May 10, 2006, http://seekingalpha.com/article/10372-lexmark-s-and-hp-s-
printer-business-model-is-increasingly-unsustainable-lxk-hpq/.
117. See id.
118. See generally Bogoslaw, supra note 115.
119. See Lexmark Int l, 387 F.3d at 551.
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Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technology, the court held there was
no liability under the DMCA, 120 but left the DMCA intact and ripe for
further abuse. Chamberlain, the manufacturer of garage door openers and
transmitters, sued Skylink, a rival manufacturer, for creating a universal
transmitter that worked with Chamberlain's garage door openers. 21
Chamberlain had developed an opener with a copyrighted "rolling code"
program that constantly changed the garage transmitter signal. 122 Skylink
sold a universal transmitter that could bypass Chamberlain's rolling code
protection and operate Chamberlain's garage door devices. 123
To prevent Skylink from selling its universal transmitter,
Chamberlain filed a lawsuit against Skylink, claiming the universal
transmitter was a circumvention device. 124 The court, however, rejected
Chamberlain's claim, emphasizing that "the DMCA does not create a new
property right for copyright owners." 125 In doing so, the court explained
that the DMCA does not "divest the public of the property rights that the
Copyright Act has long granted to the public." 126 Furthermore, the court
stressed that "the DMCA emphatically did not 'fundamentally alter' the
legal landscape governing the reasonable expectations of consumers or
competitors." 127 Thus, the court seems to admonish against such anti-
competitive use of the DMCA's anti-circumvention provision.
However, the court missed its opportunity to analyze the
consequences of enforcing DRM schemes that essentially deny
interoperability. First, the court found that Chamberlain did not prove that
its software copyright had been infringed, 128 a finding that brings into
question the applicability of the DMCA to the case altogether. Second,
Chamberlain placed no limitations on how its customers could use its
products or what type of replacement products they could buy. 129
Accordingly, the court found that "[t]he Copyright Act authorized
Chamberlain's customers to use the copy of Chamberlain's copyrighted
software... that they purchased.., therefore [making them] immune from
§ 1201(a)(1) circumvention liability." 130 Though the court used some
120. See Chamberlain Group, 381 F.3d at 1204.
121. See id. at 1183.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 1185.
125. Id. at 1204.
126. Chamberlain Group, 381 F.3d at 1204.
127. Id. at 1194.
128. See id. at 1203-04.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 1204.
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sweeping language to condemn misuse of the DMCA, it effectively left the
scope of the anti-circumvention provision untouched and its potential for
misuse intact. The outcome of this case may have been different had
Chamberlain met its evidentiary burden, established that use of its software
was unauthorized, and that only Chamberlain openers could be used with
Chamberlain transmitters.
F. Consequences of DMCA Protection of DRM
Both Lexmark and Chamberlain represent cases in which the
DMCA's anti-circumvention provision was unsuccessfully invoked by
companies to curtail genuine competition. 131 Neither case involved piracy
or illegal transfer of digital content over the Internet, or United States
obligations under World Intellectual Property Organization treaties. 132
Instead, they both represent attempts by corporations to maintain higher
profit margins through legally protected DRM schemes designed to prevent
interoperability between similar products. 133 Both courts denounced such
use of the DMCA and tacitly acknowledged that the DMCA gave extra-
legal protection to copyright holders. 134 Both opinions seem like victories
for those who are concerned with the consequence of legally protected
DRM schemes. However, these cases essentially left the DMCA fully open
to such use. 135 The Lexmark court suggested that if Lexmark had hidden
its authentication code, it could have claimed it as a security device that
"control[led] access" to its copyrighted material. 136 Likewise, if
Chamberlain had printed "not to be used with non-Chamberlain" devices
on its boxes, the court would likely have ruled in its favor. 137
"Paracopyright" is a term used by commentators to describe the extra
layer of protection provided by the DMCA's anti-circumvention provision
for companies that employ DRM schemes. 38 Paracopyright rules protect
131. See Lexmark Int'l, 387 F.3d at 551; see also Chamberlain Group, 381 F.3d at 1204.
132. See generally Lexmark Int'l, 387 F.3d at 549; Chamberlain Group, 381 F.3d at 1194-
95.
133. See generally Katie Dean, Lexmark Loss Good for Consumers, WIRED, Aug. 27, 2004,
http://www.wired.comtechbiz/media/news/2004/10/65494.
134. See LexmarkInt'l, 387 F.3d at 549; Chamberlain Group, 381 F.3d at 1198-99.
135. See Lexmark Int'l, 387 F.3d at 547; Chamberlain Group, 381 F.3d at 1204.
136. See Lexmark Int'l, 387 F.3d at 547.
137. See Chamberlain Group, 381 F.3d at 1204 (explaining that Chamberlain did not meet
its burden of proof in showing a lack of authorization).
138. See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18 (2004); see also Stacy F.
McDonald, Comment, Copyright for Sale: How the Commodification of Intellectual Property
Distorts the Social Bargain Implicit in the Copyright Clause, 50 HOW. L.J. 541, 561 (2007).
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the security technologies that companies create to protect their underlying
copyrights. 139 These security technologies can then protect the underlying
works in ways that traditional copyright law does not. Thus, in addition to
the bundle of rights that copyright holders have always enjoyed under
traditional copyright statutes, the DMCA expands copyright protections. 140
By imposing liability for unauthorized circumvention of protection
technologies, the DMCA creates entirely new rights and remedies
pertaining to copyright infringement. The anti-circumvention provision of
the DMCA represents a significant change in American copyright
tradition 141 because it shifts the balance of competing interests away from
the public to the copyright holder. 142 As a result, the DMCA has enabled
companies-for instance, online music retailers like Apple's iTunes Music
Store-to use DRM technology for illegitimate purposes.
IV. THE DMCA's LEGAL PROTECTION OF DRM CREATES AN OPENING
FOR COMPANIES TO MISUSE DRM IN ANTI-COMPETITIVE WAYS
The increased power wielded by copyright holders because of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act's (DMCA) protection of Digital Rights
Management (DRM) has a significant, unintended consequence. Namely,
copyright holders employing DRM protections can use the technology anti-
competitively by suppressing interoperability. 143 Even though Lexmark
and Chamberlain represent instances in which courts held in favor of the
defendants, 144 the DMCA continues to be misused to stifle competition.
Online music stores, including Apple's iTunes Music Store (iTMS), sell
music encumbered with different forms of DRM protection that have the
common effect of restricting music playback to specific portable music
players, while claiming the feature is only to prevent piracy. 145 Since
iTMS controls an overwhelming portion of online music sales 146 and Apple
139. See Balkin, supra note 138, at 18; see also McDonald, supra note 138, at 560-61.
140. See McDonald, supra note 138, at 559-61.
141. See Fred von Lohmann, Measuring the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Against the
Darknet: Implications for the Regulation of Technological Protection Measures, 24 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L. REV. 635, 635 (2004) [hereinafter von Lohmann, Measuring].
142. See id.
143. See id. at 648.
144. See generally Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522,
551 (6th Cir. 2004); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1204 (D.C.
Cir. 2004).
145. See The Customer is Always Wrong: A User's Guide to DRM in Online Music,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/pages/customer-always-wrong-users-guide-
drm-online-music (last visited Mar. 12, 2008).
146. See Nicola F. Sharpe & Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Is Apple Playing Fair? Navigating
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sells the world's most popular music player, 147 its practice of restricting
interoperability has come under increased scrutiny. 148
The lack of interoperability with non-Apple devices through Apple's
use of FairPlay DRM has led to claims that Apple uses DRM protection as
an anti-competitive restraint on consumer choice by preventing
interoperability between iTMS-purchased music and non-Apple digital
music players. 149 Not surprisingly, Apple is currently facing an antitrust
lawsuit concerning this very issue in the form of two consolidated class
action lawsuits. 150 Apple is also facing the possibility of new regulations
in several European jurisdictions in response to iTMS' lack of
compatibility with other music devices. 151 Apple's iTMS represents the
best example of the anti-competitive nature of DRM's use in online music
stores.
A. The iTunes Music Store
Apple's iTMS is the undisputed champion of online music retail,
having sold over three billion music tracks since its inception in April of
2003. 152 Currently over eighty percent of all music sold online is sold by
iTMS. 153 In March 2008, iTMS surpassed Wal-Mart to become the
number one music retailer in the United States. 154
When Apple unveiled iTMS, it sold individual music tracks for
ninety-nine cents and most complete albums for $9.99, a price structure it
had negotiated with the record labels. 155 In return, Apple was required to
the iPod Fairplay DRM Controversy, 5 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 332, 333 (2007).
147. See May Wong, Apple Retail Stores Revamp for the Holidays, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Nov. 24, 2007, available at
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2007/11/24/apple-retail-stores-revamp-for.holidays/.
148. See Thomas Crampton, For Apple, Europe Becoming a Tougher Customer, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Aug. 2, 2006, at 8, available at
http://iht.com/articies/2006/07/16/yourmoney/music I7.php.
149. See Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 146, at 336.
150. See Apple Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) at 38, (May 10, 2007), available at
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000110465907037745/a07-13266-1 10q.htm
15 1. See Crampton, supra note 146.
152. See Press Release, Apple Inc., iTunes Store Tops Three Billion Songs (July 31, 2007),
available at http://www.apple.com/prllibrary/2OO7/07/31itunes.html; see also Press Release,
Apple Inc., Apple Launches the iTunes Music Store (Apr. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2003/apr/28musicstore.html.
153. See Richard Siklos, Universal Music's Rebellion Against Apple Portends Growing
Tension between the Music Industry and the ipod, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 8, 2007, at 43,
available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/07/08/sports/frenzyO9.php.
154. See Press Release, Apple Inc., iTunes Store Top Music Retailer in the US (Apr. 2
2008), available at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2008/04/03itunes.html.
155. See Laurie J. Flynn, Apple Offers Music Downloads with Unique Pricing, N.Y. TIMES,
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sell music with FairPlay DRM. 156 With FairPlay, purchased songs cannot
be played on more than five computers and cannot be copied onto compact
discs more than seven times. " FairPlay DRM also prevents iTMS-
purchased songs from playing on all portable music devices, except for
Apple's iPod. 158 Furthermore, DRM-protected music purchased from
competing online music stores cannot be played back on either iTunes
music software or on Apple's iPod. 159
Thus, people who have purchased songs from iTMS are incentivized
to purchase an Apple iPod digital music player, rather than one made by
another manufacturer, in order to have the option of listening to their music
portably in addition to listening on their computer. Once consumers have
purchased music from iTMS, there is little incentive to purchase other
products or services that may be incompatible with iTMS. As a
consequence, consumers can become tied to a line of products and services
that may be more expensive and have fewer features than competing
portable music players. 160 More importantly, consumers' freedom to
choose alternative products, even inferior ones, is diminished.
Lack of interoperability also affects other online music retailers. 161
For instance, iTMS competitors have a hard time attracting subscribers and
downloaders because their DRM-protected music is incompatible with
Apple's iPod music player. 162 Interestingly, Apple CEO Steve Jobs
responded to these accusations of anti-competitive behavior by claiming
Apple has no choice but to employ the restrictive FairPlay DRM. 163 In a
comment posted on the Apple website, Jobs claimed he would
wholeheartedly embrace music unencumbered by any DRM protections on
iTMS, but the major record companies would not allow it.164 Apple was
and is contractually obligated to sell its music with FairPlay DRM
Apr. 29, 2003, at C2; Steve Jobs, CEO, Apple, Inc., Thoughts on Music, Feb. 6, 2007,
http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic/.
156. See Jobs, supra note 155.
157. See Apple, Authorization FAQ,
http://www.apple.com/support/itunes/store/authorization/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
158. See Benderoff, supra note 5.
159. See Jim Welte, Yahoo Music Chief Jabs at DRM, Feb. 24, 2006,
http://www.mp3.com/news/stories/3418.htm.
160. See Eric Benderoff, Rivals to iPods are Music to Your Ears, Ct1. TRIB., Nov. 26, 2007,
at Cl; see also Donald Bell, Top Flash Memory Players, http://reviews.cnet.com/best-flash-
memory-mp3 -players/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
161. See Welte, supra note 159.
162. See id.
163. See Jobs, supra note 155.
164. See id.
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protections. 165 Thus, Jobs implies that Apple does not intend to cause a
lack of interoperability through Fairplay DRM, but it is an inevitable
byproduct of its obligations to record companies. 166
Jobs went on to suggest that licensing Apple's FairPlay DRM
technology to other companies would not be a feasible alternative. 167
Disclosing Apple's FairPlay "secrets" to outside companies would
"inevitably" lead to Internet leaks of its FairPlay DRM software. 168 In
turn, such disclosure would compromise Apple's contractual commitment
to record labels because Apple could no longer quickly respond to breaches
in FairPlay DRM security. 169 He argued that Apple could not guarantee
FairPlay's effectiveness once the software is in the hands of third parties-
licensing their DRM for third-party use would defeat FairPlay's ability to
protect copyright holders. 170 Essentially, Jobs claimed his hands were tied
because record companies demanded the use of FairPlay DRM and because
licensing FairPlay would compromise the DRM's effectiveness. Perhaps
Jobs' argument might seem more credible if Apple had not exhibited the
deft ability to effectively control its software "secrets" so many times
before. 171
B. RealNetworks Circumvents FairPlay and Apple Responds
Before Jobs' call to remove DRM protections from music,
RealNetworks (Real), a competitor, unlocked FairPlay's software "secrets"
without Apple's consent. 172 In July 2004, Real introduced its Harmony
Technology, which allowed songs purchased from Real's Rhapsody online
music store to be played on Apple's iPod. 173 Harmony Technology
accomplished this by converting music purchased from its store into a
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See Jobs, supra note 155.
170. See id.
171. See generally Jefferson Graham, Apple Lashes Real Networks' Music Move, USA
TODAY, Aug. 30, 2004, at IB, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2004-07-29-
applex.htm (quoting an Apple press release that states, "When we update our iPod software
from time to time it is highly likely that Real's Harmony technology will cease to work [with
iPods]").
172. See John Borland, iPod Secrets Unlocked by RealNetworks, July 26, 2004,
http://networks.silicon.coml/webwatch/0,39024667,39122560,00.htm?r--l/.
173. See Press Release, RealNetworks, RealNetworks Introduces Harmony, Enabling
Consumers to Buy Digital Music That Plays on All Popular Devices (July 26, 2004),
http://www.realnetworks.com/company/press/releases/200
4 /harmony.html [hereinafter Real
Press Release].
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FairPlay protected music file. 174 Real issued a press release at the time of
Harmony's launch that quoted several representatives of major record
labels praising the move and stated that Harmony Technology addressed
the foremost problem facing the distribution of online digital content: the
need for interoperability. 175
Real even launched a promotional campaign entitled "Freedom of
Music Choice," which proclaimed that "[c]onsumers are getting a raw deal
with the status quo in digital music, which limits healthy, open competition
that drives down prices and encourages innovation." 176 However, the
campaign failed to win the support of consumers, as evidenced by the
overwhelming amount of negative comments users left on the "Freedom of
Music" website. 177 Real's perceived hypocrisy was chief among the
complaints left on the website. 178 The DRM that encumbered Real's
Rhapsody music files not only prevented compatibility with Apple's
devices, 179 the very problem Real had purported to fix with Apple's iTMS
music files, but Real's DRM protections were more restrictive than Apple's
FairPlay DRM. 180 Additionally, Real's end-user licensing agreement
prohibited reverse engineering of its DRM 18 1-the same technique that
Real used to breach Apple's DRM protections. 182
Apple responded to Real's implementation of Harmony by saying it
was "stunned that [Real had] adopted the tactics and ethics of a hacker to
break into the iPod." 183 Unsurprisingly, Apple stated it would examine the
possibility of invoking the DMCA against Real. 184 This prompted Real, in
an August 2005 Securities and Exchange Commission filing, to disclose to
its investors that "[i]f Apple decides to commence litigation against us in
order to prevent interoperation with its products, we may be forced to
spend money defending their legal challenge, which could harm our
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See Fred von Lohmann, Hypocrite, Thy Name is Real, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND., Aug. 18, 2004 http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2004/08/hypocrite-thy-name-rea/.
177. See Jo Best, Real v. Apple Music War: iPod Freedom Petition Backfires,
SILICON.COM, Aug. 18, 2004, http://hardware.silicon.com/storage/0,39024649,39123271,00.htm.
178. See id.
179. See id.; see also von Lohmann, supra note 176.
180. See The Customer is Always Wrong, supra note 145.
181. See RealNetworks, Distribution License for RealPlayer Basic and/or RealPlayer Basic
with RealJukebox Basic, http://www.real.com/licensing/agreement.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2008).
182. See Best, supra note 177.
183. See Graham, supra note 171.
184. See id.
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operating results." 185 Real also acknowledged "the risk that Apple will
continue to modify its technology to 'break' the interoperability that
Harmony provides to consumers" and that if "Apple chooses to continue
this course of action, Harmony may no longer work with Apple's
products... or we may be forced to incur additional development costs to
refine Harmony to make it interoperate again." 186 Though Real believed
its product was legal, it admitted that it could not guarantee that it would
withstand judicial scrutiny. 187 Thus, Real faced both legal and
technological obstacles. In the end, Real abandoned Harmony Technology
software due to these obstacles, particularly the threat of litigation. 188
Moreover, Real seemed convinced that Apple's ability to continually
update its FairPlay DRM would make Harmony's sustainability
difficult. 189 Apple gave credence to Real's fears in a statement it issued
warning customers that Harmony-converted songs would no longer work
with Apple's iPods. 190 Though Apple's software "secrets" could be
circumvented, 191 Apple maintained an advantage because it has the
technological ability to update its software, as well as the DMCA to deter
its competitors.
Real's fear of litigation may have arisen from firsthand experience
with the DMCA. Real was among the first to invoke the statute to protect
its use of DRM. 192 When software manufacturer Streambox created the
Streambox VCR, a device that gave users the ability to copy Real's
Realmedia audio and video files, Real sued claiming a violation of § 1201
of the DMCA. '3 The court imposed a preliminary injunction 194 and
Streambox eventually settled, agreeing to remove their software's
recording ability and to pay Real damages. 195
185. Applelnsider.com, Real Admits Risk of Apple Lawsuit, Aug. 10, 2005,
http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/05/08/10/real-admits-risk-of apple-lawsuit.html.
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. See Wikipedia, FairPlay, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FairPlay_%28DRM%29 (last
visited Mar. 12, 2008).
189. Applelnsider.com, supra note 185.
190. See Graham, supra note 171.
191. See Jobs, supra note 155.
192. See von Lohmann, supra note 176.
193. See RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. 2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311, at *1
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
194. See id.
195. Monica Soto, Deal Protects RealNetworks-Generated Files, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 9,
2000, at BI, available at
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20000909&slug=TTQP I HF7J.
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C. The "Real" Reason Music Stores Use DRM
Apple, Real, and even major record label officers admit that the lack
of interoperability hurts customers and hurts the music industry itself. 196
Nevertheless, they all use the DMCA in an anti-competitive manner to
protect their business interests. 197 Apple claimed that it could not license
FairPlay because of the risks posed by hackers. 198 However, illegal
programs that circumvent every major DRM scheme, including Apple's
own FairPlay, are already available online. 99 Moreover, when Apple's
FairPlay did end up in the hands of rival Real, both companies implicitly
acknowledged that Apple's ability to provide constant software updates
made Real's Harmony program unfeasible.200 Jobs' argument that
licensing FairPlay DRM to third parties would inevitably lead to software
leaks is disingenuous. FairPlay has already been leaked with little damage
to Apple who has shown a rapid ability to respond to leaks. 201
Real's actions are even more hypocritical. While the company touted
a desire to free "consumers from the limitation of being locked into a
specific portable device," 202 it seemed to want to do so only if that device
was an Apple iPod.203
Apart from Jobs' argument against licensing FairPlay DRM to third
parties, concerns about piracy are strikingly absent from the DMCA
lawsuits. 204 Apple and Real are using the technological might of their
DRM protections and the legal might of the DMCA to lock out their
competitors, but not to thwart piracy. 205 When a piece of legislation,
originally intended to combat piracy, is used by rival companies to leverage
control over their respective markets, it raises the question of whether that
piece of legislation is really serving its purpose. The most obvious answer
is that the legislation-as it stands- does not accomplish what it was
intended to accomplish.
196. See Paul R. La Monica, Steve Jobs vs. The Music Industry, CNNMONEY.coM, Feb. 7,
2007;
http://money.cnn.com/2007/02/07/commentary/mediabiz/index.htm?section=money-news-funny
see also Real Press Release, supra note 173.
197. See Lee, supra note 8.
198. See Jobs, supra note 155.
199. See Lee, supra note 8.
200. See Jobs, supra note 155.
201. See Jobs, supra note 155.
202. Real Press Release, supra note 173.
203. See generally von Lohmann, supra note 176.
204. See id.
205. See Graham, supra note 171.
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V. DRM HAS LITTLE PRACTICAL EFFECT ON PREVENTING PIRACY
BECAUSE IT PUNISHES LEGITIMATE CONSUMERS
The 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act's (DMCA) use of Digital
Rights Management (DRM) protections simply does not do what it was
intended to do: fight piracy. Moreover, DRM technology does nothing to
prevent widespread illegal file-swapping over the Internet, which is one of
the main sources of music piracy. 206 Despite the music industry's efforts
to shut down illegal peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, new methods of piracy
continue to emerge. 207 DRM protections cannot prevent this piracy. 208
Instead, DRM protections inflict damage on public values and upset the
delicate balance between the public interest and the interests of the
copyright holders. 209
A. The New Generation of Internet Piracy: BitTorrent
Perhaps the most infamous P2P file-sharing software was Napster. 210
Napster emerged in 1999 and at the peak of its popularity had twenty-six
211million users. Various music companies jointly sued Napster for
contributory copyright infringement, and Napster eventually settled the
case. 212 After Napster, other file-sharing networks emerged, such as
KaZaA, LimeWire, and iMesh.213 Eventually, under the threat of
litigation, these P2P networks were restructured as legal pay-for-download
services or were simply shut down.2 14 Though many popular P2P
networks no longer exist-at least as illegal file-swapping sites-piracy is
thriving now more than ever. 215 New ways of transferring digital content
over the Internet have replaced the older generation of P2P technology. 216
Released in 2001, BitTorrent is the most popular of these new
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communication protocols.217 BitTorrent is faster and more efficient at
distributing content than previous P2P technologies. 218 It works by
dividing digital files into small pieces and spreading them between
different downloaders. 219 Unlike previous P2P methods that slowed the
rate of transfer as total traffic increased, the speed of transfer between
BitTorrent users increases as more people transfer files. 220
BitTorrent represents between fifty to seventy-five percent of all P2P
activity on the Internet. 221 By some estimates, BitTorrent constitutes
between forty and fifty percent of total Internet traffic. 222 Although any
type of digital content can be transferred using BitTorrent, music files are
the most popular and the most downloaded files. 223 As new pirating
technologies have appeared, the amount of illegal file-sharing has
dramatically increased. 224
B. Despite Increases in Piracy, DRM Continues to Target
the Wrong People
Despite the abundance of transfers taking place through illegal file-
sharing networks, the music industry's use of DRM protections targets
consumers who pay for legal downloads, thereby punishing innocent
parties for the actions of illegal file sharers. 225 The number of illegal P2P
users has tripled in the last four years, increasing to nine million. 226
Despite the Recording Industry Association of America's (RIAA) 26,000-
plus 227 lawsuits against individual file-sharers, the number of households
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that downloaded illegal P2P programs increased eight percent in 2006
alone. 228 Illegally downloaded tracks in 2006 equaled five billion in the
United States, nearly doubling the number from the previous year. 229
In contrast, the number of legal downloads was only five hundred
million last year. 230 Even though music companies have expended
tremendous time and resources combating piracy caused by P2P file-
sharing, their efforts are yielding no lasting results. 231 Instead, their efforts
have only served to make illegal downloads more appealing. 232 Why
should consumers pay for legal music downloads with restrictions when
downloading unencumbered music is free and easy?
Some executives in the entertainment industry have acknowledged
that DRM protections do not prevent piracy, but such protections are
necessary to "keep honest people honest" by reminding them not to pirate
content. 233 However, the results of a recent experiment by rock band
Radiohead questions this sentiment. 234 In October 2007, Radiohead made
their latest album available only on the Internet. 235 Consumers could go to
their website and could pay any amount-including zero-to download the
album. 236 The majority of consumers paid retail price for the album, 237
and the release week sales of the album exceeded the band's previous
release week sales. 238 Interestingly, the number of pirated downloads of
Radiohead's album through BitTorrent exceeded 500,000 during the
album's first six days of release. 239 Thus, even though the music was free,
distribution of the music on illegal P2P networks still occurred, as
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thousands chose to pirate it. 240
Consequently, Radiohead's experiment illustrates the obvious fact
that honest people do not need a reminder to keep them honest. While
some people will act honestly, and by extension legally, many will not.
Thus, DRM-laden songs only serve to punish the honest by restricting their
legitimately purchased music. If the music industry wishes to promote
honesty, it should punish pirates, not legitimate music purchasers.
C. The Pirate Bay
Not only has piracy increased, but the most notorious piracy
promoters are beyond the traditional reach of United States copyright law
because they are based in foreign nations. There are various music files
available across the Internet, and unlike older P2P software, BitTorrent
does not provide a list of those files. Instead, users must find the "torrent"
files on their own. A torrent tracker is a website that indexes the torrent
files and centrally coordinates transfers between peers. 241 The Pirate Bay,
based in Sweden, is the world's most popular torrent tracker 242 and
receives an estimated 12,000 requests for content every second. 243
The Pirate Bay represents another obstacle in fighting piracy because
it lies outside of U.S. jurisdiction. At the Motion Picture Association of
America's (MPAA) insistence, Swedish authorities raided The Pirate Bay's
operations in 2006 and shut it down, but the site became operational again
three days later.244 The incident actually elicited sympathy for the
website's operators in Sweden, 245 a country that views copyright
infringement less critically than does the United States. 246 Not only has
The Pirate Bay eluded the entertainment industry's legal challenges, the
website has actually expanded its operations by reviving previously shut
down torrent trackers. 247 Moreover, it is developing new P2P software that
will make digital transfers untraceable.
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Piracy is a global challenge for the music and movie industries, and
the new producers of P2P technology are both relentless and elusive.
Given that illegal downloading is so widespread, the use of DRM will have
no effect on piracy as a whole because legal downloads comprise an
insignificant percentage of all downloads.
D. DRM Provides No Protection Against Piracy
On a very practical level, DRM provides no real protection against
piracy because the restrictions are, oftentimes, very easy to circumvent.
For example, no special software or knowledge of computer science is
necessary to bypass Apple's FairPlay. A user can simply bum FairPlay-
laden songs on a compact disc (CD) and import the songs from the CD
back to the iTunes library, thus eliminating the DRM. 248 Moreover,
Apple's iTunes Music Store (iTMS) exclusive tracks are found on P2P
minutes after appearing on iTMS, further demonstrating the ineffectiveness
of FairPlay's DRM protection. 249
Even if DRM was completely impervious to circumvention, Internet
piracy would not be curbed because DRM-free digital music already exists
in the form of a CD. 250 In fact, CDs are the source of most of the shared
music online because they can easily be ripped to a computer, encoded, and
transferred to others through a P2P program. 251 It only takes one digital
DRM-free track to leak on a P2P network and then proliferate into
hundreds or even thousands of copies through peer transfer. 252
VI. CONCLUSION
Digital Rights Management (DRM) does not prevent piracy or
provide the music industry with any benefit. DRM punishes people who
have downloaded their music legally by placing restrictions on the way
they use their music. This incentivizes unlawful downloading through
various illegal peer-to-peer (P2P) systems. Section 1201 of the Digital
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Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) complicates matters by protecting
DRM schemes and preventing interoperability by implicitly creating a legal
safeguard for closed technology platforms. When analyzing cases
involving DRM protection schemes, courts must look to see if a DRM
scheme has been circumvented instead of focusing on how DRM has been
misused. Nevertheless, § 1201's narrow focus on circumvention creates
room for companies to misuse DRM by claiming piracy prevention and
copyright infringement as a pretext.
Apple's iTunes Music Store (iTMS) and iPod are the most evident
examples of DRM's misuse. Apple acknowledges DRM is not effective in
preventing piracy and even claims to support DRM-free music, 253 but
Apple's conduct towards RealNetworks belies its rhetoric. 254 Apple's
large share of both the online music sales market and the portable music
device market leaves the music industry little flexibility in how it
distributes music online.255 Apple will not allow variable pricing
structures proposed by music labels, and music companies are beholden to
Apple's sales terms because Apple controls an overwhelming share of legal
online music downloads. 256 So far, other online music retailers and
portable music device players have not posed a credible threat to Apple's
market dominance.257 Thus, if the music industry wants to break free from
Apple's tight hold of online music sales and control pricing, it must offer
music unencumbered by DRM protections.
However, the music industry should not fear music being distributed
online without DRM protections. An early report indicates that major
music label EMI is already selling DRM-free music at a much higher rate
than music with DRM protections. 258 Moreover, popular bands like
Radiohead 259 and online music stores like eMusic 260 have successfully and
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profitably offered DRM-free music. Amazingly, eMusic has become the
second largest online music seller behind iTMS, without the benefit of
major music label support to boost its sales.261 Furthermore, evidence
suggests those who purchase content from eMusic do not share that content
on illegal file sharing networks. 262 Thus, selling music unencumbered by
DRM can be both viable and profitable.
The DMCA's prevention of interoperability through legal protection
of DRM safeguards Apple's market dominance. Music piracy has
flourished as legal music purchasers are punished. Offering DRM-free
music will benefit both consumers and the music industry. Consumers will
have the freedom to play their music without restrictions. Furthermore, the
music industry will have more control over music pricing and distribution.
If the music industry intends to survive the compact disc's imminent
demise, it must embrace the next evolution of music content delivery:
digital music downloads unencumbered by DRM protections.
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